This is one of the standard explications of Humean causal realism. He follows Hutcheson in thinking that they assign two distinct roles to self-interest in their accounts of morality: first, moral approval and disapproval are based in a concern for our own interest and, second, the motive of which we ultimately approve is self-interest.
This question I propose as much for the sake of information, as with an intention of raising difficulties. Ott, Walter. But what is this connection? The moral sentiments and the concepts to which they give rise are products of taking up that standpoint. Of these, two are distinctions which realist interpretations insist that Hume respects in a crucial way but that non-realist interpretations often deny.
In fact, the title of Section 1. His critique of metaphysics clears the way for the constructive phase of his project—the development of an empirical science of human nature—and Hume is not at all skeptical about its prospects.
We would never admire the good deeds of our enemies or rivals, since they are hurtful to us. This book is perhaps the most clear and complete explication of the New Hume doctrines. The bread, which I formerly ate, nourished me: that is, a body of such sensible qualities was, at that time, endued with such secret powers; but does it follow, that other bread must also nourish me at another time, and that like sensible qualities must always be attended with like secret powers?
The chain of reasoning I need must show me how my past experience is relevant to my future experience. But if this is right, then Hume should be able to endorse both D1 and D2 as vital components of causation without implying that he endorses either or both as necessary and sufficient for causation.
We agree to hand over our power and freedom to a sovereign, who makes the laws necessary for us to live together peacefully and has the power to enforce them.